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Abstract 
Place is a social site of meaning and memory. The critical appreciation of 
place and its link to power in toponymic studies involve the identity 
politics of place naming. This paper discusses the relationship between 
the naming of places and identity construction in Turkey. First, 
conceptualized as a hegemonic practice, the Turkification of toponyms 
in the Kurdish region of the country is argued to be part of a broader 
system of assimilation. Supported by the imposition of particular ethno-
nationalist narratives on the past, and conducted with concomitant 
processes of linguistic and demographic design, top-down and 
centralized engineering of the country’s toponymic order has two sides; 
the construction of symbolic Turkish spaces and the cultural erosion of 
Kurdishness. Later, the research examines the act of naming places as a 
Kurdish strategy of resistance and a cultural right. As an attempt to 
remove spatial and linguistic injustice, Kurdish toponymic practices aim 
at re-asserting the ‘self’ and reclaiming memory, space and identity 
through the re-introduction of former place names or new alternatives 
that are conducive to the reparation of the Kurdish identity. The 
discursive and material struggle over space and the clash between the 
Turkish and Kurdish discourses on naming places reflect the overall 
structure of social and political power relations in Turkey. 
Keywords 
Critical human geography, toponymy, Kurdish assimilation in Turkey, 
identity politics. 
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For power to ‘speak’ socially, power must ‘speak’ with space. 
Constantin (1987: 219) 
 
Just as there are no purely spatial processes, neither are there any  
non-spatial social processes. 
Massey (1984: 52) 
 
 
Crafting symbolic geographies in modern Turkey1 
Kurdish assimilation and the politics of (re)naming 
1 Introduction 
As part of the on-going peace process between the Kurdish guerrilla group, the 
PKK, and the Turkish state, a democratization package was announced by the 
government in September 2013. While it lacked a clear legal and political 
infrastructure for the implementation of presented reforms, the package 
introduced the renaming of Kurdish villages whose names had been Turkified 
by the state. The official acknowledgement of the country’s toponymic heritage 
has led to a popular consciousness on the spatial and linguistic dimensions of 
identity. Recent debates on Turkey’s pre-nationstate toponymy have 
highlighted ‘place’ as more than a point on the map.  
"Without naming, identification, or representation by ordinary people, a 
place is not a place". (Gieryn 2000: 465) Places are sites of memory and 
representation, rather than mere physical spaces2. The meaning attached to 
them is a crucial part of collective memory and identity. A place embodies 
values, cultural norms and social categories. The acknowledgement of place as 
a social force and a consequence of social interactions, is particularly significant 
in Turkey, a monolithic post-empire nation-state. In modern Turkey, since the 
establishment of the nation-state in 1923, there has been a state-directed 
project of standardization and homogenization. The naming of places has been 
a tool in the construction of a uniform Turkish identity, which at the same 
time has meant the destruction of the ‘other’, Kurdish in this context. By 
intervening in the processes of meaning and memory production in non-
Turkish regions through the Turkification of toponyms, the Turkish state has 
rendered particular visions and narratives inevitable and natural. The current 
focus of the Kurdish opposition on the expansion of freedoms and cultural 
recognition is significant since it involves reclaiming Kurdish spaces from the 
Turkish state on a symbolic level through the act of renaming the landscape. In 
                                                 
1 Inspired by a current cultural and political debate in Turkey, this research seeks to 
contribute to the limited literature on identity and space in the Turkish context. I 
would like to thank dr. Helen Hintjens and dr. Dubravka Zarkov for their valuable 
and insightful comments.  
2 ‘Place’ and ‘space’ are used interchangeably. 
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this paper, I argue that naming places is a process of identity construction, and 
as political declarations, Turkish and Kurdish toponymic practices reflect the 
overall social and political relations of power in Turkey.  
1.1 Research question 
This research mainly aims to answer the following question: 
To what extent has the (re)naming3 of places played a role in the 
construction and appropriation of identities within the contexts of the Turkish 
nation-state and the Kurdish struggle for cultural recognition? 
1.2 Methodology and limitations 
The main objective of this research is to explore the politics of place naming in 
Turkey. As an attempt to explain the link between toponymic practices and 
identity construction, the study aims to investigate hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourses on language, memory and space. In doing so, the 
research utilizes both qualitative and quantitative data. However, since the 
question at hand is a topic that needs to be carefully situated within particular 
political and social contexts, the study rests mainly on a qualitative basis. Data 
collection consists mostly of secondary data, such as literature reviews, and 
primary evidence, such as government documents and archives. A great deal of 
empirical input in this research is drawn from document analysis. Online 
databases of the Republican Archives, the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Parliamentary Archives were scanned and relevant documents, 
such as legislative acts, proposed parliamentary bills and ministerial decrees, are 
reviewed. The interpretation of evidence only makes sense within a historical 
context of Turkish and Kurdish politics, which is framed based on a 
comprehensive review of literature on Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms.  
While the toponymic practices of the Turkish state have recently been in 
the spotlight, the topic has been largely ignored in the literature. In addition, 
the study of Kurdish claims on place names and the analysis of the Kurdish 
renaming strategies remain untouched by the academic scholarship. Since the 
process of Kurdish renaming is a recent phenomenon, the cases discussed in 
this research are mostly drawn from online newspapers. My intent was to 
conduct semi-structures interviews with local officials in the Kurdish region in 
order to overcome the lack of literature on Kurdish renaming. However, my 
requests to discuss the issue via phone or e-mail were unattended by three 
municipalities and I was explicitly refused by a governorate. As a consequence 
of limited literature and significant lack of cohesive quantitative evidence, 
which is drawn mainly from academic sources, the data is handled with 
                                                 
3 In this paper, ‘naming’ refers to the act of assigning Turkish names to places by the 
Turkish state in the context of nation-building and the assimilation of non-Turks. 
‘Renaming’ on the other hand is used in the sense of assigning back the original 
Kurdish names to relevant places or giving alternative names to new Kurdish 
settlements.  
8 
 
scepticism in this research. Due to incoherent data on the numbers of 
settlements and places that have been given Turkish names, I avoid giving 
exact numbers. However this should not mean that the study is based on 
insufficient or inadequate evidence; the numbers add up to yield coherent 
percentages that are explanatory and meaningful within the context of the 
research.  
1.3 Relevance and justification 
Traditional geography studies space as a phenomenon detached from social 
relations of power, failing to capture it as a site of power contestations. On the 
other hand, most literature on nationalism approach space as a tool of 
advancing nationalist discourses through spatial practices and policies, implying 
that the act of naming is a hegemonic practice. Building upon, yet going 
beyond these perspectives, in this paper, I argue that the political act of 
(re)naming is a spatial and linguistic strategy, used by the both sides of the 
spectrum. While it is a tool for nation-building and assimilation for the 
sovereign state in the case of Turkey, it is a form of resistance for the excluded 
or assimilated minority. While arguing that space is socially and politically 
produced, following Massey (1984: 54-55), this paper acknowledges that 
“social processes are constructed over space.” In this regard, resistance refers 
to the contestation of hegemonic impositions and the re-assertion of the ‘self’ 
through spatial and linguistic means. Therefore, when studied in relation with 
the cultural erosion of the Kurdish identity in Turkey, ‘renaming’ emerges as a  
means for toponymic justice. Reclaiming Kurdish spaces through the renaming 
of the landscape and the introduction of Kurdish meanings point out to the act 
of assigning names to places as a right. Thus, in this paper, Kurdish toponymic 
practices are thought of as a struggle for social justice. 
1.4 Organization of the paper 
This research has two main parts located on the same timeline from two 
different perspectives. In the first part, I explore the process of Turkish nation-
building, covering from the early 1920s to the 1940s, and the practices of 
Kurdish assimilation, by paying particular attention to spatial and linguistic 
policies of the state. Building upon this analysis, I then examine the 
Turkification of place names, which I refer to as ‘toponymic engineering’, and 
its role in the cultural erosion of the ‘other’, Kurds. 
In the second part, I explore the Kurdish political opposition since the 
establishment of the Turkish nation-state and by going through particular 
phases of the movement, I try to highlight its discursive shift, which had led to 
the adoption of renaming as a resistance and opposition strategy. Finally, I 
elaborate on the Kurdish attempts to redesign the space by renaming it and the 
relation of this strategy to the struggle for cultural recognition and identity 
construction. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
Traditional geography considers ‘space’ as a geographic location in terms of 
quantitative measures with a focus on its geometrical dimensions. Analytically, 
it is excluded from the understanding of social change along a time-axis. The 
equation of time with ‘becoming’ and change, while space is associated with 
‘being’ and stasis, is the basis of conventional social and cultural geography 
(Gambetti and Jongerden 2011: 375). Yet the perception of space as a reactive 
and passive object has been replaced by a spatial consciousness in social 
thought (Lefebvre 1991, Massey 2005, Soja 1989). Since the 1990s, the 
emergence of the idea of “space as socially produced” (Unwin 2000: 12) has 
pointed out to its relationality with memory, meaning and identity (Kearney 
and Bradley 2009). The perception of space as a physical entity, detached from 
cultural interpretation and value attachment, has been succeeded by the 
realization of the interrelationship between space and human practices (Casey 
1996). In the context of space-sensitive social thought, place is conceptualized 
beyond objective and physical boundaries, as an “interpreted, narrated, 
perceived, felt, understood and imagined” (Gieryn 2000: 465) product of social 
practices. Consequently, the introduction of ‘place’ as a socially constructed 
and contested site of interpretation, identification and representation, indicates 
“complex constellations of power knowledge” (Berg and Kearns 1996: 104) as 
the sphere of place formation. Thus, taking account of the “power structures 
that embed social phenomena within sets of spatial relations” (Gambetti and 
Jongerden 2011: 376) is crucial for the study of toponyms4 in a critical way.  
In this perspective, place names are “documents of power” (Matthews 
1995: 456). As “symbolic texts, embedded in larger systems of meaning and 
ideology that are read, interpreted, and acted upon socially by people” [Duncan 
1990 (cited in Alderman 2008: 199)], place names are more than spatial 
references on the map of landscapes: “they [toponyms] are active participants 
in the construction and perception of social reality.” (Azaryahu 1997: 481) 
Hence the study of toponyms needs to involve a critical appreciation of power 
and take account of their embeddedness in social and political power relations. 
Within this frame, the central focus of this research is less on the semiotic 
meaning of particular place names and their sociolinguistic analysis than their 
symbolic meaning and the act of naming itself.  
Most literature focus on the interconnectedness between place naming 
and power within the context of nation-building, by mainly arguing that 
changing toponyms according to particular world views and ideologies 
operates as a means to enforce a tailored adaptation of the past and selected 
aspects of national identity (Azaryahu 1997, Gill 2005, Light 2004, Azaryahu 
and Golan 2001, Cohen and Kliot 1992, Guyet and Seethal 2007). Naming in 
this sense represents the reproduction of power relations through “claims of 
national ownership” (Berg and Kearns 1996: 100) by the political authorities of 
the emerging nation in order to “erase signs of earlier political and ideological 
regimes and to advance new notions of national identity.” (Alderman and 
                                                 
4 Place names.  
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Inwood 2013: 213) However, by putting great weight on the constructive 
aspects of nation-building and the aspirations of state ideologies, most research 
in the field neglect “the dimensions of resistance and how place naming is 
open to social negotiation and debate as marginalized groups, such as racial 
and ethnic minorities, struggle to redefine what is considered worthy of public 
remembrance.” (Alderman 2008: 208) In this study, the act of assigning names 
to places is conceptualized as a claim of territorial and symbolic ownership, 
embedded in social and political power relations. Nevertheless, in order to 
analyse naming practices as power strategies, “exercised both by those having a 
great deal of [social] power and by those who comparatively lack it” (Myers 
1996: 244), toponymic changes in Turkey are examined within two different 
analytical frameworks: on the one hand, as a state-directed nationalizing and 
homogenizing strategy by the Turkish nation-state, which will be called 
‘naming’, on the other hand, as “symbolic reparation” (Alderman and Inwood 
2013: 216), a form of resistance and a right on the part of marginalized and 
silenced Kurdish population of Turkey, which will be referred to as ‘renaming’.  
2.1 Place naming as a nationalist project 
The study of nationalism and nations mainly evolves around the distinction 
between the ethno-symbolist and modernist views. According to ethno-
symbolists, nation is a historical community as a continuity of pre-modern 
ethnie (Hutchinson 2005, Smith 2009). The ethno-symbolist focus on the 
appropriation of symbols, memory and myths, through which loyalty and 
attachment to the nation are achieved, identifies nations as ancient phenomena 
having pre-modern ethnic communities as their predecessors. While ethno-
symbolists put great emphasis on ethnic past and the reinterpretation of shared 
historical elements, the modernist approach argues that nations are modern 
artefacts. The birth of nation as an invention of modernity is explained 
through particular processes, such as industrialization (Gellner 1983), 
secularization (Anderson 1991) and the rise of the bureaucratic state (Breuilly 
1982, Mann 1993). However, the common denominator of the modernist view 
is that nation is a modern construction as “primarily a political principle, which 
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.” (Gellner 1983: 
1) Thus, the attachment to the modern nation, an “imagined political 
community” in Anderson’s (1991) words, is accomplished based on a sense of 
belonging, conscious consent and perceived common interests of the 
members.  
Calhoun (2007) acknowledges the theoretical limitations of studying 
nation as either an ancient or modern phenomenon and distinguishes between 
three phases of emerging nations having claims both in the past and the future. 
The first phase refers to the collective imagining of peoples' aspirations within 
the context of a common national identity that is constantly promoted by a 
nationalist rhetoric. In the second stage, Calhoun identifies policies or social 
movements that aim to pursue the nation’s interests either by strengthening 
loyalty to an existing state or moving towards independence by exercising the 
right to self-determination, as the pillars of nationalism as a political project. 
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Finally in the last phase, the nationalist discourse acquires a moral basis: what is 
right and expected from the members is defined with references to the national 
character, while those who do not conform to the national moral high ground 
are excluded. Besides going beyond the distinction between the definitions of 
nation as a "reinterpretation of cultural motifs and the reconstruction of earlier 
ethnic ties and sentiments" (Smith 2001:83) and as a modern political 
community created by "the construction and deliberate invention of national 
imagery" (Oktem 2004:563), Calhoun's elaboration on the birth of nations 
points out to the discursive reproduction of nationalism as the ideological, 
social and political basis of belonging. While the nationalist discourse 
determines the cultural elements, ethnic components and future aspirations of 
a nation, it also inscribes a certain identity. Therefore, nationalism becomes a 
project in terms of constant reproduction and engineering of national identity.  
Hobsbawm (1990) notes that nation-building inherently involves social 
and political engineering strategies in order to implement social cohesion and 
concretize the national identity. According to Oktem (2004), social engineering 
tends to dominate the nation-building process in the case of a detachment 
between the dominant ethnie and the territory. In order to achieve the 
congruence between the national and the political units, in Gellner’s terms, 
social and political engineering policies become essential in the formation of 
nation-states out of multicultural empires (Hobsbawm 1990). Thus in the case 
of the transition from the heterogeneous Ottoman society to the uniform 
Turkish national identity and nation-state, the acknowledgement of nation-
building as a modern form of socio-political engineering, which is at the same 
time greatly informed by the appropriation of the past and national symbols, 
would be the appropriate analytical framework.  In this respect, state-directed 
systematic naming of Kurdish spaces by the Turkish state should be studied as 
a project of homogenization, aiming at imposing a certain ethno-nationalist 
discourse and a particular national identity through spatial and linguistic 
control.  
2.2 Toponymic practices as systems of inclusion and 
exclusion 
The naming of places, as a spatial and linguistic strategy “claiming ownership” 
(Berg and Kearns 1996: 100) of space in the context of nation-building, 
operates as a means to incorporate space and time, and to re-appropriate 
geography and history on material and discursive levels (Oktem 2004). The 
naming of the immediate past through toponymic practices in order to 
homogenize and nationalize the territory, introduces a particular canonized 
version of history as the definite representation of the past (Azaryahu 1996: 
319). Thus, in order to examine the mutual constitution of society and space 
through toponymic practices, the conceptual framework has to expand beyond 
the conventional approach to geographical space and articulate an 
“understanding of ‘active space’, which is not a merely a backdrop or a 
container of social change, but exerts a vital influence on group identities and 
nations.” (Yiftachel 2002: 220) In this perspective, the naming of places as a 
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strategy to directly intervene in the collective memory of territories and to 
institutionalize the official translation of history needs to be understood as a 
means to design the national identity and to control the reproduction of 
meaning within the boundaries of a particular nationalist rhetoric. 
As in the case of the Turkish nation-state, in the context of regime change 
and revolution, state-directed place naming represents “an unequivocal political 
declaration” (Azaryahu 1997: 481) operating both on symbolic and material 
levels by introducing new ways of meaning-making and by intervening in the 
direct relationship between people and their landscape. The new regime asserts 
a new form of spatial organization and new toponyms through which a 
particular worldview is imposed. Entrikin [1991 (cited in Azaryahu 1996: 312)] 
notes that “the ability to control the meaning of such settings is an important 
expression of power” and states that the transformation of space into a 
national homeland is mainly secured by the fusion of heritage, memory, place 
and identity into one particular national character (Alonso 1994). Lefebvre 
(1991: 54) explains the spatial concerns of new regimes by pointing out to the 
power of space in crafting the socio-political order and argues that a revolution 
is only complete after successfully producing its own space and changing life 
itself more than it constructs political structures and institutions: “A social 
transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative 
capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space – though its 
impact need not occur at the same rate, or with equal force, in each of these 
areas.” Within this analytical framework of space and its naming, belonging 
and collective identity are “related to the discourses and practices of socio-
spatial inclusion and exclusion” [Antonsich 2010 (cited in Alderman and 
Inwood 2013: 219), which necessitates a closer look at the role of toponymic 
practices in sustaining binary oppositions of identity. According to Alderman 
(2008: 196), “naming as symbolic capital” is a strategy that delivers “distinction 
and status to landscapes and the people associated with them”, while on the 
other hand it subordinates and disadvantages certain identities and alternative 
forms of meaning-making. Since naming places is an effective strategy to 
produce and preserve the discursive space of self-identity, it simultaneously 
defines and allocates internal ‘others’. By incorporating the space and the time 
of the ‘other’ into homogenized and nationalized space, the naming of places 
leads to the “discursive erasure of the other.” (Jongerden 2009: 33) Therefore, 
the acknowledgement of the destructive aspects of nation-building and 
toponymic engineering on culturally, historically and socially diverse territories 
is central for this research. As part of a wider range of assimilative hegemonic 
discourses and state policies, “the construction of a system of place names 
reflecting the nascent national order of time and space” (Oktem 2008: 1) needs 
to be examined not only as a constructive force in the making of nation, but 
also a destructive effort to silence the ‘other’.  
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2.3 Renaming as resistance and the right to rename 
Gambetti and Jongerden (2011: 382) suggest that the struggle over space is in 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms, aiming at controlling the visibility of 
signs and symbols, including place names. While the enforcement of a national 
identity through the homogenization of toponyms during nation-building 
processes, social and national imaginaries can be re-appropriated and cultural 
assimilation can be reversed by the act of renaming. Azaryahu (1996) notes that 
the renaming of places introduces an alternative version of what is to be 
remembered, and inserts cultural and symbolic meanings that are conducive to 
the reparation of the marginalized identity. As a means to reclaim the place and 
the past, renaming promotes identification with an alternative set of cultural 
meanings and memory to those endorsed by the hegemonic political authority. 
In cases where state-led naming is associated with "practices of erasure and 
identity politics" (Rose-Redwood 2008: 433), the renaming of places serves as a 
strategy to contest and challenge hegemonic spatial practices. "The return of 
the other" (Jongerden 2009: 33) relies on renaming as a "cultural arena for 
racial and ethnic minority struggles to reshape the identity of landscapes, the 
contours of social memory, and the larger sense of political membership." 
(Alderman and Inwood 2013: 213) While critical human geography represents 
a political shift in the study of place names by introducing renaming as a form 
of resistance, a limited literature goes further to address the 'right' to rename. 
In this perspective, defined as the "right to participate in the production of 
space" (Alderman and Inwood 2013: 224) and the "inalienable right to know 
and call into being the places that define identity" (Kearney and Bradley 2009: 
81), renaming refers to a  strategy of 'spatial justice’5 that is the empowerment 
of historically and culturally marginalized communities in their claim for 
visibility in public sphere, political legitimacy and identity (Schein 2009).  
3 Naming places as a hegemonic practice 
Turkish nationalism was born in the first half of the 19th century, promoting 
Turkishness on cultural grounds until its transformation into a political project 
of the 1923 Kemalist6 revolution. The establishment of the Turkish Republic 
constituted a fundamental transformation from a culturally heterogeneous 
Ottoman Empire to a monolithic Turkish nation-state. As a “state in search of 
its nation” (Kadioglu 2005) the Republic relied heavily on the politicization of 
the culture and the symbols in the creation of a uniform Turkish national 
                                                 
5 Spatial injustice evokes Bourdieu's (1991) "symbolic violence" through spatial terms, 
which refers to the systematic domination and marginalization of groups in society by 
the imposition of cultural meanings and classifications. 
6 Kemalism refers to the founding ideology of modern Turkey and is associated with 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic. Its main 
principles are republicanism, secularism, statism and Turkish nationalism.  
Based on Skocpol’s (1979) classification, Kemalist revolution of 1923 represents a 
top-down, elite-led revolution as in Germany and Japan, as opposed to the French, 
Soviet and Chinese cases. 
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identity out of the remnants of the Ottoman past. Kemalist political elite 
directed four concomitant processes of transition; from decentralized imperial 
administration to Weberian rational-legal state 
• from decentralized imperial administration to Weberian rational-legal 
state 
• from religious socio-political order to highly secularized political do-
main and public sphere 
• from Ottoman ‘millets’ 7 to a monolithic Turkish identity 
• from traditional to modern, which refers to ‘Western’ in the Turkish 
case, based on a linear understanding of progress and the enlighten-
ment thought (Yildiz 2007).  
During the World War I, the Turkish War of Independence and the first years 
of the new regime, Islam remained the strongest component of loyalty to the 
nation and attachment to the patrie; Turkish-Kurdish alliance of the time was 
mainly based on shared Muslimhood.8 In the Ottoman Empire, Kurdish 
provinces functioned as buffer zones due to their strategic locations, which 
gave them a relatively autonomous status (Bozarslan 2002). Following the 
regime change and the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, not only did 
the Kurds lose autonomy, but the alliance was broken as a result of greater 
ethnic emphasis on the Turkish national identity. The Kurdish population in 
Turkey, concentrated in the eastern and southeastern regions, became the 
object of ethnic, cultural and linguistic assimilation. 
3.1 Building the Turkish nation-state: modernization and 
the internal colonization of the Kurdish periphery 
Modernization, defined strictly in terms of Westernization in the Turkish 
context, provided the main rationale for the Kemalist nation-building project. 
Considered as a linear process of inevitable socio-political transformation, 
"Turkish modernity, in its Republican movement arrogated to itself 
enlightenment values of rationality, progress and universality." (Houston 2001: 
89) The equation of Western civilization to the source of all knowledge and 
                                                 
7 ‘Millet’ is originally an Arabic word, meaning ‘religion’. The Ottoman society was 
organized around religious affiliations that formed different millets. Although religion 
was the main social category of identity, Turks were the dominant people within the 
empire, which later became the founding ethnie of the Turkish nation-state.  
8 In the World War I, the Ottoman Empire fought against the Allied Forces (the 
United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Empire) alongside Germany and Austria-
Hungary. Following the defeat, the empire was partitioned and invaded by the Allies, 
Italy and Greece, which led to the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). The 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) was founded in 1920, during the war of 
independence. Until the proclamation of Republic in October 1923, the parliament 
introduced a constitution in 1921 and abolished the Sultanate in 1922, which officially 
meant the end of the Ottoman rule.  
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development led to a series of reforms9 in the following decades after the 
revolution. Seen as an obstacle in the adoption of the Western principles, 
religion was eliminated from the political and social realms. Aiming at the 
institutional secularization, the Kemalist modernization project excluded 
religion from political and public spheres by confining it to the private sphere.  
Although the Ottoman Empire had not had a colonial past, the Kemalist 
elite was similar to Fanon's (2004) colonized intellectual in their understanding 
of progress and their aspiration to Westernize their culture in order to liberate 
it (Yildiz 2007: 117). In this context, Turkish modernization, inspired by the 
Western civilization, emerged at the same time as a reaction to the Western 
depiction of Turkishness as backward and underdeveloped. Interestingly, the 
Kemalist project of modernization, led by the Turkish ethnic core of the 
nation was fostered by the same "value-laden binary oppositions: 
modernity/tradition, civilization/savagery, us/them, centre/margin, 
civilized/wild, humanity/barbarity, progress/degeneration, 
advanced/backward, developed/underdeveloped" (Houston 2001:10) in the 
domestic sphere. ‘’The assimilation of non-Turks and the construction of an 
excusionary state ideology were made possible by state-led production of 
knowledge relying on European Orientalist principles (Zeydanlioglu 2008). The 
Republican project of civilization, referred to as "internal colonization" by 
Jongerden (2009:10), mainly targeted the Kurdish periphery: as prospective 
Turks, the Kurdish population was categorized as inferior, backward, primitive 
and to be civilized by the Turkish nationalist discourse. "The white Turkish 
man's burden" (Zeydanlioglu 2008: 159), taken on by the Kemalist elite, aimed 
at the "social transformation of the backward into the modern, of the tribal to 
the state, of Kurds into Turks." (Gambetti and Jongerden 2011: 376) Thus, the 
1920s were marked by increased politicization of the culture, a total 
transformation of the socio-political order through reforms, a radical 
secularization project and the emergence of a de facto strategy of colonization 
of the Kurdish periphery, while the 1930s witnessed further ethnicization of 
Turkishness and the systematization of assimilative policies. 
                                                 
9 Relevant political, social, legal and cultural reforms implemented in the 1920s and 
1930s are as follows: 
• The Caliphate, religious courts and madrases (schools of Islamic edu-
cation) were abolished, and the national education system was unified 
under the monopoly of the state in 1924. 
• Gregorian (Western) calendar was adopted and Islamic calendar was 
outlawed in 1925.  
• The Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 1926. 
• The constitutional article stating Islam as the religion of the state was 
withdrawn and Latin script was adopted in 1928.  
• Women's suffrage for local elections was granted in 1930, for nation-
al elections it was introduced in 1934 (Unsal 1979).  
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3.2  Turkification of populations and territories 
The 1930s were marked by the emergence of systematic policies of 
Turkification of territories and populations. Rather than a political ideal of a 
supra-identity, Turkishness took a political turn to be an ethnic construction. 
The equation of the nation to its ethnic core and the transformation of the 
post-Ottoman heterogeneous territory into a mono-ethnic homeland were 
aimed at through strategies of ethnocratic regimes10 (Oktem 2004: 564). 
Religion, excluded from the socio-political realm, was replaced by Turkishness, 
increasingly defined in ethnic and linguistic terms, as the main informant of 
identity and a requirement for belonging to the nation. Non-Turkish, mainly 
Kurdish territories, were targeted by ethno-nationalist centralization policies 
and the processes of "deterritorialization and re-territorialization of state 
power" (Gundogan 2011: 392). The official version of the past of the core 
ethnie was legitimated and imposed by the Kemalist regime through the 
selective reinterpretation of history. In addition, the ethnicization of 
Turkishness was simultaneously regulated by a process of linguistic 
homogenization. In the 1930s, the Turkification of public sphere, religion, daily 
life, language, history and internal 'others' appeared to be the main concern of 
the Republican elite. A speech by Ismet Inonu, the then prime minister, given 
in 1932 in the National Assembly, pointed out to assimilation as a state policy: 
We don't expect anything extraordinary from any individual, living in this 
country, who wants to become a Turkish nationalist and a Turkish citizen. 
Choosing and accepting to be a Turk is enough for possessing all the rights, 
granted to the members of the Turkish nation. (Yildiz 2007: 290) [my translation] 
The equation of citizenship to becoming a Turk indicates that assimilation 
was a condition for having and exercising the citizenship rights. In this context, 
assimilation of non-Turks was regulated through three concomitant state-led 
strategies, namely spatial regulation, the creation of a hegemonic historiography 
and linguistic engineering, which later accounted for the basis of the systematic 
policy of toponymic changes.  
State-directed systematic policies of spatial regulation of the 1930s were 
mainly concerned with the "geographical nationalization" (Ulker 2008: 2) of 
the territory and the transformation of the demographic structure, especially of 
Eastern Turkey, where the Kurdish population had been concentrated. On the 
micro level, the Republican space was designed in a way that symbols of the 
new regime and the national identity were promoted: "A] main street would 
run to Republic Square with a statue of Ataturk in the middle emphasizing the 
centrality in the new social order, while at the head of the square there would 
                                                 
10 Yiftachel (1999: 368) defines ethnocracy as a "regime, which attempts to extend or 
preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic territory. 
Ethnocracy develops chiefly when control over territory is challenged, and when a 
dominant group is powerful enough to determine unilaterally the nature of the state."  
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be a People's House, the (CHP) party building." 11 (Jongerden 2009: 14) The 
public space in the new regime was designed by power geometries, reinforcing 
the visibility of hegemonic Republican symbols and materially strengthening a 
certain social imaginary (Gambetti and Jongerden 2011: 382). On the macro 
level, policies of demographic engineering12 in the first half of the 20th century, 
had three essential purposes; assimilation, modernization and security. While 
the employment of spatial measures, such as the resettlement and deportation 
of Kurds to appointed regions, served as a means for their ethnic and linguistic 
assimilation, spatial regulations also aimed at weakening the tribal ties in the 
Kurdish region. Lastly, the redesign of Eastern Turkey was crucial in order to 
craft a ‘modern’ Turkish nation: the Eastern space was seen as a social and 
cultural barrier against modernization.  
The first resettlement policies13 emerged in 1925, yet the assimilative 
design of the territory took a systematic and planned form in the 1930s: the 
Settlement Act was passed in 1934. The law divided the country in three zones 
as the following: 
Zone 1: Places where the concentrating of populations of Turkish culture [was] 
desired. 
Zone 2: Places set aside for the relocation and settlement of populations whose 
assimilation into Turkish culture [was] desired.  
Zone 3: Places that [would] be inhabited, and where settlement and residence 
[would] be prohibited due to spatial, sanitary, cultural, political, military and 
security reasons. (Ulker 2008: 19-21)  
The act gave the Ministry of Interior the authority to manage the country’s 
new demography based on the ‘Turkishness’ of populations. Turkishness was 
defined in terms of "adherence to Turkish culture" (Ulker 2008: 17) and 
speaking Turkish was a condition of belonging to the nation. Zone 1 referred 
to the Eastern provinces where the overwhelming majority of Kurds in Turkey 
resided, while Zone 2 indicated the appointed regions, mostly in Central and 
Western Anatolia, where part of the Kurdish population was forced to move. 14 
                                                 
11 People's houses [Halk Evi], founded in 1932, were state-sponsored institutions of 
adult education. By offering programs on Western literature, music, history and fine 
arts, they functioned as official academies of modernization.  
12 Oktem (2008: 11) defines demographic engineering as "the state-directed removal 
or destruction of certain communities from a given territory in order to consolidate 
power over that territory and prepare the conditions for the nation-state project its 
vision of space and time." 
13 The Reform Plan for the East was declared in 1925, introducing special 
administrative measures. The plan banned the use of Kurdish in both public and 
private realms and prohibited the appointment of Kurdish-speaking civil servants to 
eastern provinces. Muslim Turks, migrating from Russia and Western Thrace, were 
settled in Kurdish provinces. 
14 According to Tekeli (1990), approximately 3000 Kurds were sent to Central and 
Western Anatolia between 1920 and 1932. By the end of the decade the Kurdish 
population, forced to migrate, increased sharply: during the 1930s, around 25,380 
Kurds, 5074 households, were forced to leave.  
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Finally, Zone 3 referred to the centres of Kurdish opposition to the Kemalist 
regime. 15 
 As part of the official attempt to assimilate Kurdish provinces, the 
Settlement Act of 1934 was the legal basis of demographic engineering as a 
movement both in time and space: while populations were moved physically 
from their lands to state-appointed provinces, they were also moved 'forward' 
on the linear understanding of Kemalist progress. Until the transition to 
multiparty democracy at the end of the 1940s, policies of demographic 
engineering served as a direct intervention in the relationship between the 
Kurdish population and their land, thus their collective memory, and a 
manifestation of state ownership of the territory. Systematic and long-term 
policies of demographic and geographic design assisted the creation of Turkish 
spaces and the homogenization of all identities and social phenomena as 
'Turkish'. The crafting of Turkey’s demography went hand in hand with the 
construction of a canonized version of history, which served as the 
legitimation of the assimilative state ideology.  
The state’s claim of ownership on populations and space during the 1930s 
and 1940s coincided with the attempt to align the past and the future on the 
grounds of a particular ideology. By re-appropriating history in l ine with the 
vision of the dominant ethnie, selective representation of the past, promoted as 
the only and official way to see the history, aimed to "appropriate and 
transform local and regional histories and the memories of subordinated 
groups." (Alonso 1994: 389) Kemalist imagination of the 'heroic' past 
functioned as a source of legitimacy for the Republican regime, while it 
targeted the Kurdish cultural and historical memory by devaluating it. By 
rendering the 'other's heritage invisible, the nationalist discourse proclaimed 
the ethnic core of the nation, Turks, as the rightful owner of the territory 
through the construction of a  hegemonic narrative. The superiority of the 
dominant ethnie was built upon the representation of the other groups as 
historically or culturally inept or unworthy to control the territory (Yiftachel 
2002). The task of re-appropriating the past was given to the Society For the 
Study of Turkish History, founded in 1931, which later became the Turkish 
Historical Society in 1935. In 1932, at the First Turkish History Congress, the 
Turkish History Thesis was presented. The main purpose of the thesis was to 
claim Anatolia as the Turkish homeland (Yildiz 2007: 162). According to the 
thesis, the Turkish ethnie originated in Central Asia and through massive 
migration waves Turks moved to Anatolia where they built great civilizations 
(Yildiz 2007: 180). The introduction of Central Asia as the geographical origin 
of the Turkish ethnie marked a clear break from the Ottoman and Islamic past. 
References to Central Asian history and great emphasis on pre-Islamic past 
helped the Kemalist regime label the Ottoman history as religiously backward 
and uncivilized, and legitimize the Republican version of the past. Most 
importantly, the declaration of Turkish territorial and discursive ownership and 
the manifestation of ethnic hegemony served as a means to devaluate the 
                                                 
15 The Settlement Act was revised in 1947 and Zone 3 was expanded. The ban of 
settlement in these provinces was rescinded in 1951.  
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'internal other', "conservatively religious Turk, non-Turkish speaking Muslim 
and non-Muslim" (Oktem 2004: 568). The hegemonic Turkish historiography, 
as a product of the Kemalist commitment to positivism, scientific knowledge 
and progress, shared pre-Ottoman references and the ideal of Westernization 
with the project of l inguistic engineering.  
Starting in the second half of the 1930s, the construction of a certain 
historical narrative and aggressive language policies mutually reinforced each 
other in close relation with greater emphasis on an ethnic definition of 
Turkishness. Language, as one of the most important pillars of the nationalist 
ideology, served as a justification of the nation-state and the basis of the 
Turkish national identity. Linguistic practices of the regime were mainly 
implemented and legitimized as part of modernization and Westernization 
efforts (Fernandes 2012: 76); they aimed at transforming the Ottoman 
language into a unified and standardized Turkish by eliminating linguistic 
diversity. As Ucarlar (2009: 120) remarks, "the diversity in languages in 
Anatolia was an obstacle to the construction of a  homogeneous cultural 
identity that would become the basis of the national one. Thus, the imposition 
of Turkish language became the most significant instrument of the state for 
creating a Turkish national identity." Since the Turkish language was the main 
component defining the socio-political content of the national identity, 
linguistic practices and policies became the basis of assimilation. While in 1925, 
the public use of Kurdish and its teaching in public schools was banned, as 
part of the Eastern Regions Reform Plan, the use of any other language than 
Turkish was prohibited in certain provinces in Eastern Turkey (Bayar 2011: 
116). 16 In 1928 the Law on the Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters 
was passed. The adoption of Latin alphabet, phonetically aligned with Turkish 
language, instead of the Ottoman Perso-Arabic script, had two main functions: 
it was "introduced not only to undermine the power of religious leaders … but 
also to break ties with the Ottoman past in order to accelerate the reforms in 
favour of Westernization." (Ucarlar 2009: 120)  
In 1930, a secret government circular appealed the governors of provinces 
populated by non-Turkish speaking communities, to "incorporate Turks with 
foreign dialects into the Turkish community by making Turkish their mother 
tongue." (Bayar 2011: 116, my emphasis) The circular provided an official 
guideline on the spatio-linguistic regulations of the following decades:  
• The names and populations of the villages, inhabited by Turks with 
foreign dialects shall be determined. 
• Only Turkish speaking civil servants shall be sent to the provinces, in-
habited by non-Turkish speaking populations. 
• Non-Turkish place names shall be determined and listed (Bayrak 1993: 
506-509).  
                                                 
16 Even though the plan did not explicitly state, the targeted languages were Arabic 
and mostly Kurdish.  
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The nation was equated with the dominant ethnic core chiefly on the basis 
of language during the 1930s; the definition of Turkishness took a shift from 
cultural references towards ethnicized motives based on the Turkish language. 
Rather than an instrument to facilitate political participation and social 
cohesion, language became a mechanism of assimilation and a requirement for 
belonging to the nation. In this respect, it is important to note the close link 
between language and nationhood: language did not emerge as a category of 
populations, yet it appeared as the main informant of the Turkish national 
identity. In fact, the Republican regime "redefined the contours of the language 
question so that it became inextricably linked to issues pertaining to the nation-
building process, such as the state of minorities, citizenship, national unity and 
achieving Westernization." (Bayar 2011: 112) Language was politicized and 
ideologically framed to the extent that linguistic assimilation of non-Turkish 
speakers became the core of the nation-building process. A Turkish citizen was 
officially considered to be a Muslim whose mother tongue was Turkish, which 
excluded non-Muslim minorities and non-Turkish speaking Muslims, mainly 
Kurds, from the nation (Ulker 2008: 12). By the 1940s, the elimination of 
linguistic diversity in Turkey laid the groundwork for future language policies. 
While the Turkish language established the main pillar of nationhood, linguistic 
homogenization led to the erosion of the Kurdish language. Perceived and 
delegitimized as a pre-modern resistance, Kurdish existence became the main 
target of the Kemalist regime. 
3.3 Towards systematic place naming 
The political shift in the definition of national identity towards ethnic 
references, greater spatial concern of the state and assimilative language 
policies were manifested in the toponymic design of the country. In line with 
the institutionalization of the regime through the setting of a  nationalist 
framework within which the official version of history and the linguistic 
ideology of the state were conceptualized, settlement policies, targeting mainly 
Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, were implemented in order to 
demographically homogenize the territory. Based on ethno-nationalist 
narratives on memory, language and space, the 1930s witnessed increased 
spatial concern of the state towards the Eastern provinces of the country, 
which coincided with the official rejection of Kurdish existence. The creation 
of a hegemonic Turkish historiography, the transformation of Turkish 
language into the main pillar of national identity and state-led demographic 
design of the territory established a material and discursive infrastructure that 
would justify future toponymic changes (Oktem 2008). While the 1930s 
witnessed minor and arbitrary changes in place names, the scientific and 
ideological basis for the Republican toponymic engineering was built. In 1940, 
a circular, issued by the Ministry of Interior, signalled the emergence of 
planned and long-term toponymic policies (Tuncel 2000: 27). The circular 
ordered the governors to determine and report place names with foreign 
origins for a detailed investigation. In 1946, the General Directorate of 
Provincial Administration published a directory specifying around 67,000 
names of provinces, towns, villages and hamlets to be given Turkish names 
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(Oktem 2008: 33).  Following the publication of place names to be replaced, in 
1949, the Provincial Administration Act17 was passed, indicating the beginning 
of full-scale Turkification of the country’s toponymy. The law stated that; 
village names that [were] not Turkish and [gave] rise to confusion [were] to be 
changed in the shortest possible time by the Ministry of Interior after receiving 
the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee. (Jongerden 2009: 34)  
Thus, by the end of the 1940s, along with the construction of a linguistic, 
historical and demographic infrastructure, the establishment of a legislative and 
bureaucratic framework for long-term toponymic strategies was achieved, 
targeting primarily Kurdish provinces.  
3.4 Creating symbolic Turkish spaces: toponymic 
engineering 
While the Provincial Administration Act provided the legal basis for future 
toponymic engineering strategies, it also recognized the authority of the local 
administration by setting the approval of elected officials as a condition. Until 
the establishment of the Expert Commission for Name Change in 1957, 
toponymic practices were conducted on the local level, often leading to 
inefficiency for the Republican regime. The Commission, operating under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Interior, had the task to "examine Turkey's 
toponyms and suggest Turkish alternatives." (Oktem 2008:35) Its members 
included the representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Education, the General Command of the Armed Forces, the Faculty of 
Letters, History and Geography of Ankara University and the Turkish 
Linguistic Society (Jongerden 2009: 37). With the establishment of a special 
commission, toponymic policies of the state took a systematic and planned 
form. Finally, in 1959, the Provincial Administration Act was amended18; the 
only authority on name changing was transferred to the Commission so that 
the resistance from the elected local authorities could be bypassed.   
The coup d'état in May 1960 did not cause any strategic decline in the 
toponymic practices of the time. Furthermore, right before the re-introduction 
of multi-party politics, in January 1961, The Committee of National Front, the 
military-appointed government, issued a circular prohibiting the "use of any 
foreign word for which a Turkish equivalent exist[ed]." (Lewis 1999:157) 
Although the use of Kurdish in public and private realms had already been 
banned, the circular implicitly addressed the use of the language at a time when 
cultural expressions of the Kurdish identity and symbols were harshly targeted 
by the state. In 1968, the Commission published a report on the toponymic 
changes of the period: according to the directory, by 1968, the Commission 
had Turkified around 30% of all village names in the country (Jongerden 2009: 
                                                 
17 The Provincial Administration Act No. 5442 (1949) Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Turkey, 7236, 18 June 1949.  
18 Law on the Amendment of the Article 2D of the Provincial Administration Act No. 
5442 (1959) Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 10210, 21 May 1959.  
22 
 
37, Gundogan 2011: 401, Oktem 2008: 40). The cities with the largest Kurdish 
populations underwent large-scale toponymic changes; in Mardin 91% of all 
settlement names and in Siirt, Bingöl, Mus, Bitlis, Van and Hakkari 75% of all 
toponyms had been replaced (Oktem 2008: 44).19 Until its dissolution in 1978, 
the Commission reviewed an estimated number of 85,000 rural settlement 
names and replaced around 30-33% of them (Jongerden 2009, Oktem 2008, 
Tuncel 2000).  Even though toponymic engineering strategies of the time 
targeted the Turkey’s landscape as a whole, disproportional distribution of 
place naming is significant; name changes mostly occurred in the eastern third 
of the country (Jongerden 2009: 37). The proportion of Turkified village names 
in Western and Central Turkey remained around 30%, while in Kurdish 
provinces in the eastern and southeastern regions it drastically increased to an 
average of 80% (Oktem 2008: 44). It is also important to note that the majority 
of the Turkified names did not have any commemorative purposes and 
significant political references. They were neither direct translations from the 
original names. Instead they appeared arbitrary, having "effectively de-
historicized references to a general category from nature, evoking, if anything, 
an unspecified sense of timelessness." (Jongerden 2009: 40) Mainly aiming at 
incorporating space into the Republican time by disrupting the “continuous 
accumulation of place-specific memories that are meaningful beyond 
generational differences” (Azaryahu 1996: 317), full-scale engineering of the 
country’s toponymy was directed by a highly centralized bureaucracy. Leaving 
almost no room for Kurdish political representation, state-led place naming as 
a tool in suppressing the Kurdish memory, was designed to limit cultural and 
spatial expressions of the Kurdish identity. In 1980, Turkey’s toponymy was 
largely uniform and Turkified. 
3.5 Cultural and toponymic cleansing of the Kurdish 
periphery 
During the military junta (1980-1983), toponymic campaign of the state ceased. 
However in 1983 the Expert Commission for Name Change was re-
established, although by then, up to 90% of toponyms in certain eastern and 
southeastern provinces had already been replaced (Jongerden 2009: 39, Oktem 
2008: 58). In 1983, the General Command of Mapping was founded under the 
                                                 
19 Although the mentioned provinces have been populated mainly by the Kurdish 
population since the establishment of the Republic, historically eastern and 
southeastern Turkey was also inhabited by Arabic, Armenian and Syriac-speaking 
Christian communities. A comprehensive scientific research on the origins of 
toponyms in Turkey would require the knowledge of several languages, such as 
Persian, Armenian, Arabic, Assyrian, Kurdish and their dialects. Due to the significant 
lack of research in the literature on the topic, this research does not intend to 
distinguish between ancient origins of toponyms. As it is mentioned in the previous 
chapters, the purpose of this study is the analysis of the act of naming itself in identity 
politics, rather than a linguistic analysis of place names. What is important to note is 
that starting from the 1940s, the Turkification of toponyms in eastern and 
southeastern regions of the country primarily targeted the Kurdish identity.  
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auspices of the Ministry of Defence, with the task of inspecting the printing 
and selling of maps of Turkey. The same year, the use of non-Turkish 
toponyms on maps, even in parenthesis, was banned (Nisanyan 2011: 13).  The 
Symposium of Turkish Toponyms, held in 1984, set the agenda for future 
toponymic changes as the following: 
• “Names that are not Turkish, whose pronunciation and structure is 
incompatible with the vocal harmony of Turkish, which are contrary to 
the common sense of the people shall be changed. 
• Names, which are Turkish, yet corrupted by local dialects, shall be re-
stored according to the correct orthography.  
• Foreign place names shall not be substituted by their translation in 
Turkish. However, if the old name refers to a natural or topographic 
characteristic of the village, a translation may be considered.  
• When foreign place names are replaced, no names shall be given, 
whose pronunciation may evoke the old name." (Oktem 2008:51) 
Even though the symposium set the goal of resuming the changes in 
Turkey’s toponymic order, since the early 1980s the number of changed village 
names had remained relatively low: 280 village names were replaced (Tuncel 
2000: 25). The main reason of decreased intensity of the Commission’s work 
was the fact that by the t ime, an overwhelming majority of place names in 
targeted regions, mainly Eastern and Southeastern Turkey had been already 
changed.  
As a direct intervention to the sense of continuity, toponymic practices 
meant to cause a rupture in memory and identity in certain regions of the 
country. By targeting the heritage of the 'other' in a  way that a certain historical 
and political narrative is privileged, toponymic policies were designed to 
produce particular ways of giving meaning and remembering. Since 
"remembering is at once an act of identity enforcement, land, place and 
ancestor articulation" (Kearney and Bradley 2009:83), toponymic changes 
represented an attempt to geographically redistribute identity and meaning by 
modifying collective memory, and enforcing scripted understandings of 
identities specific to particular places (Price 2004:31). The construction of a 
Turkified and uniform toponymic order was achieved by the 1980s to a great 
extent: 1/3 of the country’s topography has been renamed. The period 
following the 1980s was marked by the elimination of any residual elements of 
symbolic, linguistic, spatial and toponymic representation of the Kurdish 
identity. By the 2000s, overall around 33-35% of all village names in the 
country had been Turkified, with a considerable concentration in the eastern 
and southeastern regions (Nisanyan 2011, Tuncel 2000: 27) (Figure 1). 
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FIGURE 1 
 Geographic distribution of villages  
of which the names have been changed by 2000 
 
Each point on the map is equal to an average of 5 villages. 
Source: Tuncel 2000: 30.  
However, the state policy of asserting and imposing particular meanings 
through place name changes has always been challenged in Eastern and 
Southeastern Turkey; especially since mid-2000s, the act of assigning names to 
places has been claimed by the Kurdish political movement as a crucial strategy 
in the struggle for cultural and ethnic recognition. 
4 Renaming places as a counter-hegemomic strategy 
The Republican space, designed and imposed to demographically and 
linguistically control the nation, has always been contested at the local level. 
Yet the renaming of places as a strategy to “reclaim the region from the state 
and its assimilative policies” (Gambetti and Jongerden 2011: 386), has recently 
been adopted by the Kurdish political movement in Turkey. Linked to memory 
and collective identity, the strategies of using Kurdish pronunciations for 
Turkified place names, re-introducing the original names of rural settlements 
and deploying alternative names in urban settings have recently been the core 
of the Kurdish resistance to Republican naming. The current emphasis on 
renaming is significant as, starting from the 2000s, the Kurdish movement has 
been increasingly concerned with freedom of cultural expression, linguistic 
revival and social recognition. Greater concern of the movement with ‘the 
cultural’ in the last decade and the transformation of Kurdish liberation from 
secession to socio-cultural recognition have developed a focus on the ‘Kurdish 
space’. While critical approaches within the field of toponymic studies highlight 
the act of renaming as a form of resistance, in cases of discrimination through 
spatial and linguistic measures, it is important to understand it as a right within 
the context of social justice.  This section covers the transformation of the 
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Kurdish struggle in Turkey and discusses the Kurdification of place names as a 
strategy to remove spatio-cultural injustice. 
Kurds are an ethnic group in the Middle East, primarily concentrated in 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Kurdistan, the geo-cultural Kurdish region, is 
divided among four sovereign states where the Kurdish peoples are minorities. 
Therefore, the Kurdish identity is shaped in relation to particular hegemonic 
national identities, namely Turk, Arab and Persian, in respective states. As a 
non-national language, Kurdish is marked by considerable regional variations 
between its many dialects. The main three are Sorani, which is spoken mainly 
in Central Kurdistan (parts of Iraq and Iran), Zaza, spoken in Northern 
Kurdistan, and Kirmanji, particularly used by Kurds in Turkey (Entessar 1992: 
4). The exact number of the Kurdish population in Turkey is unknown, 
however it is estimated to be 20% of the total population, around 15 million, 
concentrated mainly in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country 
(Casier et al. 2003: 136). The establishment of the Turkish nation-state in 1923 
inevitably affected the Kurdish population, the biggest non-Turk group in 
modern Turkey, transforming their socio-political and economic orders. The 
Kurdish geography in Turkey has become the target of the Kemalist state 
ideology. 
4.1 Kurdish nationalism: from local uprisings to a mass 
movement 
In response to the rise of Turkish nationalism as a project of modernization 
and homogenization, Kurdish nationalism emerged as a highly politicized 
movement in the 1920s. The Republican reforms, especially the process of 
radical secularization and regime change, were the main reasons behind the 
emergence of the first waves of the Kurdish resistance. The abolition of the 
Sultanate and the Caliphate, the institutions from which Kurdish tribal and 
religious leaders derived their authority, in the second half of the 1920s, 
eradicated the basis of their legitimacy and damaged feudal power structures of 
the Kurdish region (Yildiz 2007: 241). In addition to the collapse of the 
Ottoman socio-political structure, the loss of autonomy and regional power as 
a result of Republican centralization further politicized Kurdish nationalism. 
Finally, the Kemalist project of ‘Eastern modernization’ created a framework 
in which the existence of the Kurdish ethnic identity was officially rejected and 
the Kurdish population was defined as a feudal community of uncivilized and 
backward prospective Turks. Although the Kurdish opposition could not 
formulate a cohesive and unified movement during the 1920s and 1930s, these 
decades were marked by a series of Kurdish uprisings20. Emerged mainly as a 
reaction to the collapse of traditional socio-political structure of the pre-
Republican era and the abolition of the Caliphate, the Sheikh Said rebellion of 
1925 was first to explicitly call for Kurdish independence, which led to the 
                                                 
20 Out of 18 rebellions, occurred in Turkey between 1924-1938, 17 took place in the 
Kurdish region. See Turkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Ayaklanmalar [Revolts in the Republic 
of Turkey] (1972) Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi [General Staff Publications]. 
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adoption of harsh measures by the state against any form of Kurdish cultural 
and political expression (Entessar 1992: 84). The rebellion was followed by the 
declaration of Kurdish independence in Agri in 1927. The Kurdish attempt to 
assert independence as a political motive was responded by “mass deportation 
of Kurdish villages, the exiling of sheiks and aghas, and the forceful recruiting 
of young Kurds into the Turkish army.” (Entessar 1992: 85) The last major 
revolt occurred in Dersim, today’s Tunceli, in 1937-38 as a reaction to the 
Settlement Law of 1934. Severely responded by the state, Dersim revolt led to 
the depopulation of entire villages and mass extermination of Kurds. The 
response of the regime was justified as a “march of civilization” (Yegen 1999: 
560), and the Kurdish resistance was perceived by the Republican state “in 
terms of reactionary politics, tribal resistance or regional backwardness, but 
never as an ethno-political question.” (Yegen 1996: 216) This period, marked 
by Kurdish uprisings having not only nationalist but also religious concerns, 
coincided with the processes of Republican linguistic and demographic 
engineering, along with assimilationist policies in every sphere of l ife.  
Following the suppression of the resistance and harsh measures taken by 
the state, the Kurdish movement focused on the production of an intellectual 
and ideological basis until the 1960s. Similar to the re-appropriation of the 
Republican Turkish historiography, Kurdish intellectuals aimed at reviving 
historical narratives and myths. Rather than questioning the Turkish (official) 
version of history, they chose to Kurdify the past as much as they were 
excluded from it. Imagining the Kurdish community and constructing a 
collective consciousness were to be done through the reinterpretation of 
Kurdish myths in a way that they refuted the Turkish nationalist narrative. As 
in the case of the hegemonic Turkish history, the Kurdish historiography 
distinguished the ‘self’ as civilized and the ‘other’, the Turk in this case, as 
barbaric through the reinterpretation of four main Kurdish myths. First, the 
myth of ethnogenesis linked modern Kurds to the oldest indigenous habitants 
of the region, pointing out to Kurdishness as an ancient ethnicity. Second, the 
homeland myth claimed Anatolia as the Kurdish homeland and directly 
confronted the Turkish historical narrative. Later, the myth of resistance called 
for an ‘eternal opposition to foreign rule’ and struggle for national liberation, 
and finally the myth of national character emphasized Kurds as the builders of 
civilization in the Middle East (Hirschler 2001: 152-153). The re-appropriation 
of Kurdish history and the creation of a Kurdish historical narrative during the 
1940s and 1950s paved the way for the Kurdish political struggle to transform 
itself into a cohesive movement in the following decades.  
4.2 Pathway towards radicalization  
The coup d’etat in 1960 not only marked a turning point for the Turkish 
democracy but also for the Kurdish movement. Although the expansion of 
democratic freedoms in the constitution of 1961 provided new channels for 
Kurdish political representation, limitations on cultural expression remained on 
the one hand, while on the other, as a result of the intellectual production in 
the previous decades, Kurdish nationalism turned into a mass movement by 
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reaching and politicizing Kurdish youth and urban university students.  In 
1965, the Turkish Kurdistan Democrat Party (TKDP) was founded as a 
representative of the 1961 Barzani movement in Northern Iraq. The 
establishment of the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO) in 
1969 was significant in defining a new ideological path for the Kurdish 
movement. The DDKO, an anti-imperialist organization with strong 
references to Kurdishness and a critique of Kemalist modernization, was 
founded by a coalition of urban Kurdish students, Kurdish intellectuals  and 
the  Turkish Left, while the Turkish Right identified the movement as a threat 
to the national unity, along with communism. The Kurdish movement re-
situated itself within a Marxist-Leninist framework, based on an anti-imperialist 
discourse in the context of ‘colonized Kurdistan’ (Bozarslan 2002). 
Urbanization and increased level of education, which according to the 
Kemalist modernization project would foster homogenization and assimilation 
of the Kurdish population, instead contributed to the construction of Kurdish 
national consciousness.  
The re-orientation of the movement towards the Left highlighted new 
requests, such as economic reconstruction of the Kurdish region, the approval 
of Kurdish as a broadcasting and instruction language, and the transformation 
of hierarchical social structures into horizontally distributed power relations 
(Entessar 1992: 91) In 1971, the statement, issued at the congress of the 
Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) openly recognized the existence of Kurds as 
an oppressed and intimidated minority that had had to face policies of 
assimilation (Nezan 1980: 97). However, following the military memorandum 
in 1971, the Kurdish movement began to detach itself from the Turkish Left 
on the grounds that, in spite of its anti-imperialist stance on Turkey’s relations 
with the West, the Turkish Left had not recognized the colonization of 
Kurdistan by the Turkish state. While the Left found that the Kurdish focus on 
ethnic recognition was increasingly divisive for the overall anti-imperialist 
struggle, it was criticized by the Kurdish intellectuals of not questioning its 
Kemalist heritage (Casier and Jongerden 2012: 5). During the 1970s, the 
Kurdish movement moved away from the broader leftist discourse and class-
based politics towards the expression of demands exclusive to the Kurdish 
people. It created its own political space on the basis of further radicalization, 
evolving around the critique of Kemalism as a de facto anti-Kurdish regime, 
and the idea of Kurds in Turkey as a colonized nation that had to fight for 
liberation. In 1977, the TKDP was divided into fragments, leading to the 
formation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978 under the 
leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, with the aim of national liberation and the 
establishment of a sovereign Kurdish state through use of arms (Bozarslan 
2002: 859).  
4.3 The PKK and the armed struggle 
The last coup d’etat in modern Turkey took place in 1980, hitting especially the 
Left and the Kurdish movement. The killing and mass imprisonment of 
Kurdish leaders and activists, and the adoption of extremely severe policies 
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against any form of symbolic and cultural representation of the Kurdish 
identity, in addition to the suppression of any Kurdish political activity, pushed 
the PKK underground, which gave rise to a  guerrilla movement. Even though 
the expression of Kurdishness had been limited and suppressed by the state in 
the past through legislative acts, the Constitution of 1982, written by the 
military junta, replaced all enactments in a decisive way:  
Article 26: No language prohibited by law shall be used in expressing 
thought. Any written or printed document, videotapes and other media items 
in violation of this article shall be confiscated.  
Article 28: No language prohibited by law shall be used in any kind of 
publication. 21  
While there was no mention of Kurdish language in the constitution, the 
‘Law on Publications in Any Other Language than Turkish’ 22, adopted in 1983, 
explicitly banned the use of Kurdish in broadcasting and publishing, and 
became a reference to the related constitutional articles. Lastly, during the same 
period, the Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code23 was revised, prohibiting 
communist and separatist movements and banning the propaganda of 
communist and separatist ideas.  
The reintroduction of multi-party system in 1983 did not seem to change 
the political and cultural pressure on the expression of the Kurdish identity. 
During the 1980s, the Kurdish movement began to be increasingly dominated 
by the PKK. Emerged from the revolutionary left, the group gained huge 
popular support in the Kurdish region and launched its first guerrilla attack in 
1984. While the Kurdish armed resistance reflected the shift of the movement 
from the left towards Kurdish nationalism, asserting secession as the liberation 
of the ‘colonized’ Kurd, greater politicization of Kurdish cultural elements and 
the use of arms increased the severity of the state response. Liberalization 
policies of the 1990s, which considerably enlarged democratic spaces in 
Turkey, were not reflected on the relationship between the Turkish state and 
the Kurdish citizen. In 1987, the OHAL (Emergency Rule Region) was 
established, covering most of the southeastern part of Turkey. The ‘super-
region’ was ruled under emergency legislation until the dissolution of the 
governorate in 2002. According to the official numbers, during the 1990s, 
3,215 settlements in 14 Kurdish provinces (approximately ¼ of all rural 
settlements in the region) were evacuated and destroyed by the Turkish army. 
Estimated numbers suggest that the army’s settlement policy forced around 1-
1,5 million people to migrate (Tezcan and Koc 2006, Aker et al. 2005). The last 
decade of the 20th century was marked by escalating violence, further shrinking 
space for Kurdish politics and severe military responses by the state. Increased 
                                                 
21 Both articles have been abolished in 2001. 
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Justice, The First and the Last Transcript of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey of 1982. 
http://www.adalet.gov.tr/duyurular/2011/eylul/anayasalar/1982ilkson.pdf. Accessed 
25 August 2013.  
22 The law has been abolished in 1991, however its de facto implementation remained. 
23 The article was abolished in 1991.  
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restrictions on political channels for Kurdish representation and the perception 
of Kurdish demands strictly within a security-oriented context led to a self-
reproducing cycle of violence (Aydinli 2011, Bacik 2002). In 1999, the capture 
of Abdullah Ocalan signalled significant policy transformations on the part of 
both the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement. 24 
4.4 Democratization as Kurdish liberation 
In 1999, the capture of Ocalan led to a decrease in the PKK’s military strength 
and a loss of organizational orientation. While the group declared unilateral 
ceasefire, another significant development in the same year took place in 
Helsinki; Turkey was declared a candidate member by the European Council. 
Political pressure from the EU on human rights issues and democratization, 
and the decline in the PKK’s military activity created a favourable environment 
for addressing the Kurdish issue. In 2002, the Law on Teaching of Foreign 
Languages was amended and the ban on teaching Kurdish in private schools 
was abolished (Aslan 2009: 34) The same year, the AKP’s (Justice and 
Development Party) huge electoral victory marked a turning point for the 
Kurdish political movement. The Kurdish support for the AKP was based on 
two main factors. On the one hand, the PKK’s nationalist discourse and it 
reliance on violence had not been able to suggest answers to political, 
economic and cultural aspirations of the Kurdish population, while on the 
other hand religiously conservative AKP emerged as a possible ally for the 
Kurdish movement on the grounds that conservatives and Kurds had been 
“the ‘other’ of the Republican hegemony of Turkish secularism.” (Casier et al. 
2013: 149) Consequently, the efforts for the EU membership and the emphasis 
on shared Muslimhood helped the government make inroads into the Kurdish 
region. During the first AKP government, legal measures were passed in order 
to align Turkey’s legislative framework with the EU requirements and 
democratic spaces were enlarged. At the same time, the government aimed at 
ideologically attacking the PKK and its leftist roots by putting great emphasis 
on Islam as the common basis of identity. The Kurdish support for religiously 
conservative and economically liberal AKP government was particularly 
motivated by increased expectations for democratization, Islam and hope for 
the future (Casier et al. 2013: 139). Yet the nationalist state discourse was still 
present in practice and continuous military operations to the PKK bases were 
approved and supported by the government. 
On the other hand, on a post-Marxist, non-state and post-nationalist basis, 
the Kurdish movement redefined its goals and strategies. In the post-2000 
period, as a result of enlarged legal and cultural spaces and increased visibility 
in the international arena, Kurdish activism transformed its focus from state 
formation to cultural contestation and symbolic creation of Kurdish 
nationhood (Aslan 2009: 37). Aiming at the total transformation of socio-
political power relations and the reconceptualization of democracy, the 
                                                 
24 Ocalan, arrested in Kenya in 1999, is serving a life sentence at the Imrali island 
prison.  
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Kurdish aspirations have shifted from the idea of secession towards Ocalan’s 
‘democratic triangle concept’. Based on the reconsideration of liberation as 
deepened democracy, rather than the formation of a Kurdish nation-state, the 
concept identifies three interrelated projects: “The democratic republic seeks to 
redefine the Republic of Turkey, by disassociating democracy and nationalism; 
democratic autonomy refers to the right of people to decide on their own 
priorities, to determine their own future; and the project of democratic 
confederation is to serve as a model for self-government.” (Casier and Jongerden 
2012: 15) The Kurdish focus, shifting towards deepening democracy, achieving 
cultural freedoms and increased Kurdish activity, placed the Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) at the centre of not only the Kurdish movement but 
also Turkish democratization process. Within this context, reclaiming space 
and meaning through the renaming of Kurdish places whose names had been 
Turkified, has become a significant Kurdish strategy. While renaming, as a 
“proclamation of cultural politics” (Kearns and Berg 2002: 283), represents a 
place-oriented consciousness from which the Kurdish existence is derived, it 
goes beyond a mere linguistic exercise and points out to a process of identity 
reparation.  
4.5 Reclaiming space, memory and identity: semiotic 
construction of Kurdish spaces 
First as a DTP (Democratic Society Party) deputy in 2008 and later as a BDP 
member in 2011, Hasip Kaplan introduced a bill in the parliament, proposing 
an amendment to the Provincial Administration Act of 1949. Kaplan’s 
proposal stated that; 
Settlement names that [had] been changed based on this law shall be used and 
written together with the old names.25 [my translation]  
Although Kaplan’s proposal of dual naming policy could not make it 
through the parliament, it has been recently adopted by BDP-led 
municipalities. In 2010, upon the decision of Diyarbakir city council, 91 village 
names were bilingually used on road signs. 26 Following the governor’s 
objection, referring to the Article III of the Turkish Constitution27, a legal 
                                                 
25 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Legislative Drafts and Proposals 
http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-0106.pdf.  
26 “Diyarbakir’da 91 Ile Kurtce Isim” [91 Village Names in Kurdish in Diyarbakir] 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25134483. Published: 24 September 2010. Accessed: 
11 September 2013.  
27 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Constitution. 
http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf.  
Article III: The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its 
language is Turkish.   
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investigation was launched.28 Finally, the State Council appealed the decision of 
the municipality on the grounds that changes in place names required the 
approval of the Ministry of Interior, and the use of the letters ‘w, q and x’, 
banned from use in the Turkish alphabet in 1928, constituted a violation of the 
law. 29 Similarly, in 2013, the municipality of Hakkari decided to use dual 
naming on road signs in rural areas. The proposal was rejected by the city’s 
governorship on the basis that the municipal government had no authority to 
change place names. 30 
As these cases indicate, despite loosening official discourse on place 
names in Eastern Turkey, elective office has no authority in toponymic 
practices. The lack of prerogative over place names in the region is the main 
obstacle for Kurdish municipalities that have been struggling for stronger local 
government. The unequivocal balance of power between Kurdish-led 
provinces and the state, and the gap between highly centralized Turkish 
bureaucracy and local administration, in terms of their sphere of authority, 
explain the Kurdish insistence on dual naming, rather than the replacement of 
given Turkish names in the rural. Bilingual usage of toponyms on road signs 
clearly aims at introducing a cultural and political Kurdish sensitivity into the 
public sphere, and reclaiming meaning and memory through the visibility of 
the Kurdish language. However, given the lack of power vis-à-vis the state, the 
strategy of bilingual use of place names seems to be carefully calculated, 
focusing on introducing Kurdish names alongside the Turkish ones, instead of 
calling for a  total Kurdification of toponyms. The Kurdish approach to the 
renaming of places is realistic when considering the data on granted former 
names in Turkey. Since the 1990s, around 110 villages and towns have been 
given back their old names, mainly based on purposes of tourism. While the 
process has been arbitrary, far from being a systematic policy of recognition, it 
has also represented an inequality in terms of distribution; the villages are 
evenly distributed across country, except for the eastern and southeastern 
                                                 
28  Provinces and their districts are governed by municipalities (elected) and 
governorships/governorates (appointed) in Turkey. Since elected officials in Kurdish 
provinces are mostly locals of the region, and appointed authorities are representatives 
of the state, cooperation between the two levels of government has always been hard 
to accomplish.  
29 The Article 222 of the Turkish Criminal Code states that those who violate the Law 
on the Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters of 1928 are punished with 
imprisonment from two to six months.  
The democratization package, announced by the government in September 2013, 
lifted the ban on the usage of the letters w, q and x in public services and education, 
however as of November 2013, no legislative measures have been passed.   
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Legislation, Laws. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html.  
30 “Valilikten Kurtce Koy Isimlerine Red” [Governor’s Rejection of Kurdish Village 
Names] http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_valilikten-kurtce-koy-isimlerine-
red_2109656.html. Published: 12 July 2013. Accessed: 8 September 2013.  
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regions where only 3 villages have been given their old names (Nisanyan 2011: 
63). 31  
While dual naming on road signs has been rejected by the state authorities, 
in recent years Kurdish place names have been bilingually used on legal 
documents by the bureaucracy. In 2009, the names of 20 villages in Ağrı, Kars, 
Iğdır and Ardahan were listed in two languages on the official website of the 
General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre. 32 Likewise, in the same 
year, the official website of Hasankeyf District Governorate used 18 Kurdish 
village names in parenthesis alongside the Turkish ones. 33 As seen in these 
cases, the state response to Kurdish renaming requests has been arbitrary and 
incoherent. In explaining the lack of cohesion in policy making, it is important 
to note that the Turkish-Kurdish dialogue is a relatively new phase where the 
attitudes of the actors are shaped and conditioned by their already existing 
beliefs. As Ross (2007: 25) emphasizes, ambiguous nature of certain political 
events and stages leads to a variety of interpretations, and “to deal with this 
ambiguity, groups turn to readily available interpretations and narratives that 
then shape subsequent behaviour.” Therefore, in such cases, mistrust between 
the parties and failure to generate coherent and uniform policies result from 
the selective interpretation of events, which strengthens existing beliefs. Thus, 
it is important to take account of the specific context in which Kurdish 
requests and policy making attempts are perceived and interpreted by the state 
actors. In this regard, the dissonance between state institutions and actors is 
mainly due to two factors. On the one hand, despite the fact that cultural and 
political reforms have been recently introduced on a symbolic level, there is a 
significant lack of legal basis for Kurdish demands to be responded cohesively. 
The lack of legislative unity leads to disintegrated state responses, and 
consequently controversy in implementation gives way to uneven recognition 
of Kurdish rights. On the other hand, non-monolithic nature of the state and 
the lack of a legal and political guideline highlight existing narratives as 
references. The reluctance of appointed state officials, such as governors and 
public prosecutors, to answer Kurdish requests that are reflective of the 
Kurdish identity, can be explained by the perception of Kurdish struggle as a 
threat to the unity of the Turkish state by the bureaucracy. Within the 
boundaries of nationalist and exclusionary state discourse on Kurdishness, 
                                                 
31 Edremit in Van and Harran in Sanliurfa have been given back their former names 
by a parliamentary decree on the grounds that they have touristic and historical 
significance. Gayda in Bitlis, where three ministers of the decade were from, has also 
been renamed.  
32 “Tapu Kadastro’dan Kurtce Acilimi” [Kurdish Opening from Land Registry and 
Cadastre] Published: 23 August 2009. Accessed: 8 September 2013. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/tapu_kadastrodan_kurtce_acilimi-951110. 
33 “Kaymakamlik Sitesinde Turkce ve Kurtce Köy Isimleri” [Village Names in Turkish 
and Kurdish on Governorship Website] Published: 18 August 2009. Accessed: 8 
September 2013.  
http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/kaymakamlik-sitesinde-turkce-ve-kurtce-koy-
isimleri/gundem/gundemdetay/18.08.2009/1129557/default.htm. 
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Kurdish visibility in the public sphere is equated to separatism, which 
consequently creates confrontations between state actors and institutions.  
While the Kurdish strategy to rename the rural and introduce dual naming 
has been facing arbitrary state responses, the renaming of the urban setting has 
had comparatively more predictable answers, mainly due to the fact that 
renaming the urban spaces has different aspirations. As opposed to bilingual 
usage of place names, toponymic redesign of the Kurdish urban space through 
the replacement of street, park and neighbourhood names, stands out as a 
direct attempt of commemoration and identity manifestation. By asserting 
commemorative names, municipalities aim at introducing Kurdish symbolic 
meanings and historical narratives into the public sphere. The incorporation of 
the Kurdish history into the realm of social life and the city, serves as a tool in 
the proclamation of Kurdish consciousness; renaming the urban becomes the 
reclamation of “the right to determine what is remembered (and forgotten) 
publically and officially.”(Alderman and Inwood 2013: 216) In this regard, 
what makes the state response predictable and cohesive is that the names 
proposed in the cities have clear intentions as references to the Kurdish history 
and identity. Based on the selective interpretation of Kurdish aspirations by 
local officials, the majority of commemorative street and park names, proposed 
by the municipality of Diyarbakir in 2007 were rejected (Jongerden 2009). As a 
reference to the Kurdish history in Turkey, ’33 Kurşun Parkı’ (33 Bullets Park) 
referred to the 33 Bullets Incident of 1943, where villages were extrajudicially 
killed on the order of a Turkish general in the Kurdish province of Van. 
Another proposed name, Çarçıra Parkı commemorated Chahar Cheragh 
Square in Iran where Qazi Muhammed attempted to declare the independent 
state of Kurdistan in 1946. Finally, a street was named ‘Zeynel Durmuş’, the 
name of a young woman who died while being chased by the police at a 
HADEP34 demonstration in 2001. These names, commemorating the Kurdish 
political struggle and the victims of violence were rejected by the governorship 
of Diyarbakir on the grounds that ‘33 Bullets Park’ was a direct accusation 
towards the state, any reference to an independent Kurdish state was 
separatism and ‘Zeynel Durmuş’ was associated with the PKK (Jongerden 
2009).  
In addition to names with commemorative purposes, in the construction 
of symbolic Kurdish spaces and new geographies of memory, names with 
cultural and ideological references have been introduced. ‘Gerzan’, ‘Botan’, 
‘Lales ̧’ (names of historically significant Kurdish regions) and ‘Zilan’ (the name 
of a large Kurdish tribe) were proposed by the municipality of Batman during 
the 2000s. They were all rejected by the governorship on the basis that they 
encouraged rebellion against the Turkish state (Jongerden 2009). In the same 
decade, the municipality of Diyarbakir proposed ‘1 Gulan’ (Kurdish for ‘May 
1st’ International Workers’ Day), ‘Asiti’ (Kurdish for ‘peace’), ‘Azad’ (Kurdish 
for ‘freedom’) and ‘Jiyanan Azad’ (Kurdish for ‘free life’) as street and park 
                                                 
34 People’s Democracy Party was a Kurdish nationalist party, founded in 1994. The 
party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2003 on the grounds that it 
supported the PKK.  
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names. While these names were not accepted, ‘Ciwan’ (Kurdish for ‘youth’) 
was approved as ‘Civan’. Reflecting the leftist orientation of Kurdish politics 
and the transformation of Kurdish aspirations from secession to freedom in 
Turkey, they were denied since they belonged to a ‘foreign’ language, Kurdish. 
Besides, in the same period, the majority of approved names in Diyarbakir 
were in Turkish. Giving expression to Kurdish aspirations in Turkish, ‘Baris ̧’ 
(Turkish for ‘peace’), ‘Özgür’ (Turkish for ‘free’), ‘8 Mart’ (Turkish for ‘March 
8th’ Women’s Day), ‘Kardes ̧lik’ (Turkish for ‘brotherhood’), ‘Özgürlük’ 
(Turkish for ‘freedom’) and ‘İnsan Hakları’ (Turkish for ‘human rights’) were 
approved by the authorities. As seen above, proposed names, in both Kurdish 
and Turkish, not only refer to cultural and historical elements of Kurdish 
identity, but also they introduce references to ideological orientation and 
aspirations of Kurdish politics. Transformed into a post-nationalist movement, 
Kurdish opposition aims at redesigning urban space with variety of toponymic 
references, invested with Kurdish symbols and meaning, which translate spatial 
struggle into the struggle for cultural recognition.   
5 Concluding remarks 
This research has discussed place naming from two different perspectives in 
one particular case. First, following traditional toponymic studies, the naming 
of places is examined as a hegemonic practice in Turkey. Since “modern forms 
of state surveillance and control of populations…have depended on the 
homogenizing, rationalizing and partitioning of space” (Alonso 1994: 382), the 
concern of the Turkish state over space, especially during the process of 
nation-building in a post-Ottoman cultural setting is significant. As a product 
of social practices and a dynamic that shapes social relations and identities, 
space has undergone a top-down, centralized process of engineering. Aiming at 
homogenizing populations through the construction of both physical and 
symbolic Turkish spaces, spatial practices of the Turkish state have claimed 
ownership over territory. Spatial design of the landscape was supported and 
contributed by the creation of hegemonic narratives of history and identity. 
Discursive, demographic and linguistic design of the Kurdish east and 
southeast went hand in hand with the exclusion of Kurdish cultural and 
political elements from the public sphere. As an attempt to transform memory 
and meaning, state-led toponymic engineering of the Kurdish ‘periphery’ 
targeted place attachment of Kurds by controlling identity boundaries and by 
imposing a t imeless sense of space. The Turkification of Kurdish place names 
within the context of a particular nationalist rhetoric designated a 
disconnection between the name of the place and its historical origin, which 
would also mean the appropriation and transformation of the Kurdish identity.  
As mentioned earlier, the scope of this paper is to explore the politics of 
(re)naming in Turkey. In examining state-led Turkification of toponyms in 
eastern and southeastern provinces, this research acknowledges Armenians, 
Arabs and Syriac communities as historical inhabitants of the region. 
Therefore, the toponymic heritage of the landscape should not be reduced to a 
monolithic entity or be associated with one particular culture. With this being 
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said, it should be noted that the politics of toponymic changes are discussed 
around the act of naming itself rather than historical meanings or linguistic 
analysis of place names. In this regard, this research is more concerned with 
the purpose of Turkish toponymic practices in eastern and southeastern 
provinces as a direct intervention to the Kurdish identity, and the re-
introduction of pre-nationstate names in rural settings by the Kurdish 
movement (which is de-Turkification of place names rather their 
Kurdification) than the origins of toponyms in the region. As a declaration of 
ownership and authority, the political and ideological act of assigning names to 
places in this sense appears as a hegemonic act by the Turkish nation-state, 
aiming at the cultural erosion of the Kurdish identity as part of a wider system 
of exclusion. 
On the other hand, following the main approach of critical human 
geography on toponymy, giving names to places is also conceptualized as a 
counter-hegemonic practice. As an attempt to overturn spatial and toponymic 
hegemony, ‘renaming’ indicates the act of place naming as a form of resistance. 
In recent years, Kurdish claims on space and toponyms have been vocal in 
Turkey. Greater concern of the Kurdish political movement over space is 
significant when taking account of its ideological transformation. The shift of 
Kurdish aspirations from an independent sovereign state towards political 
autonomy, cultural recognition, stronger local government and further 
democratization in Turkey helps explain the focus of the movement on ‘the 
cultural’. The assertion of the legitimacy of the Kurdish history, language and 
space through the re-introduction of pre-nationstate rural toponymy of the 
eastern region and the deployment of new names, invested with Kurdishness, 
in the urban setting, interacts with the overall discourse of Kurdish politics on 
cultural and political freedom. As a resistance to the Turkish toponymic design, 
which “destroyed the meanings of the former, obfuscated historical 
connections and ethno-religious patterns, but failed to replace it with an 
alternative sense of meaning” (Oktem 2008: 65), renaming involves re-asserting 
the ‘self’ and reclaiming space, memory and identity. Therefore, conceptualized 
as identity reparation in this study, renaming represents a cultural right. Based 
on the notions of restoring the Kurdish identity, re-asserting discursive and 
material ownership of Kurdish spaces and symbolically constructing the 
Kurdish nationhood, the act of renaming is thought of as a right to remove 
spatial and linguistic injustice, whose outcomes include cultural inequality and 
discrimination, beyond geographical consequences. 
Increased visibility of the Kurdish language, signs and culture is on the 
agenda of the political movement, while the Turkish government is at the 
negotiation table with Ocalan, the jailed leader of the PKK, and the 
representatives of Kurdish politics in the parliament in order to put an end to 
almost 30-year old low density war. The process of disarmament has been 
accompanied by the expansion of Kurdish political and cultural freedoms. 
Lastly, the government’s democratization package announced that former 
village names in the Kurdish region would be given back and the ban on the 
use of the letters x, q, w would be lifted. While the current state of the dialogue 
between the two parties on expanding freedoms has been positive, the official 
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response to the renaming policies of local Kurdish administrations has been 
incoherent. In addition to the present lack of legal basis for the reforms to be 
implemented, state response to Kurdish toponymic practices has been fraught 
with contradictions and inconsistencies. As an example of “toponymic 
warfare” (Kadmon 2004: 85), the current situation reflects the clash between 
the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses on space and place names. 
The political struggle over toponyms in Turkey mainly evolves around spatial 
and linguistic dimensions of identity, thus the prospects for democracy, peace 
and justice involve the politics of visibility and recognition.  
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